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Executive Summary
This report first provides a historical review of the financing methods that the Chinese government 
has used for infrastructure construction and maintenance and identifies the financial shortage 
currently faced by many Chinese provincial governments in their local infrastructure financing. The 
report then introduces some innovative financing methods used by several of the more developed 
countries with most of them proven to be effective and actionable in addressing the issues created by 
financial constraints. The report finally gives some suggestions and recommendations for relevant 
administrative units in local government about how to adopt or adapt these methods by taking into 
consideration the specific economic and political contexts of China.
(As infrastructure is such a broad and complex subject, the methods introduced in this report will 
mainly focus on transportation infrastructure. There are other domains of infrastructure such as 
telecommunications, power and energy, which are a bit different in terms of the stakeholders, 
technology, and dynamics. Accordingly, this analysis and its recommendations can be applied to 
these other domains only mutatis mutandis.)
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Introduction
“Infra” means “above,” so the word “infrastructure” literally means “the structure above the structure 
of production.” It refers to a platform from which others proceed and the framework within which 
economic activity occurs. In Chinese, we call it “SflillSJfe”, which means the underlying foundation 
or facility of a society, based on which the country can operate and perform well.1
According to this definition, infrastructure has some special characteristics compared to other 
goods or services. First, it often provides services that are considered to be essential public goods 
(such as electric power systems, roads, bridges and tunnels) with the characteristic of non-exclusivity, 
meaning that the service is one which can be consumed/enjoyed by one without denying the same 
benefits to someone else, that one person’s enjoying it does not exclude others from similar 
enjoyment, and that the consumption by one consumer does not prevent simultaneous consumption 
by others.
Second, it has another characteristic called “lumpiness”, meaning that the good or service cannot 
be readily provided in increments or in small proportions. The construction of infrastructure often 
[not always -  but as a general rule this is true; so it cannot be a defining characteristic]
[non-exclusion is also not so simple because with user fees, one can exclude some from use -  those 
who will not or cannot pay] requires a large amount of upfront irreversible investment and a long 
investment payback period, which is impossible or too risky for the private sector to provide alone.
As a result, the investment and construction of infrastructure becomes an important public sector
1 Generally, infrastructure can be divided into two types: hard infrastructure and soft (or social) infrastructure. Hard infrastructure 
includes roads and highways, bridges and tunnels, electric systems (generation, transmission, and distribution), drinking and waste 
water treatment systems (pumps, plants, and pipes), communications systems (land line systems, cell towers) etc. Soft infrastructure 
includes schools, hospitals, prisons, courthouses, senior centers, etc.
responsibility, or to be specific, government’s responsibility, both in developed and developing 
countries.
Well aware of this, the Chinese government has paid close attention to this issue from the very 
time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in October, 1949. Consistent with the 
characteristics of a centrally-planned economic system and the political structure of socialism, the 
Chinese government has carried out one of the most ambitious infrastructure construction programs 
in history, especially in the transportation area. By the end of 2015, China had the largest road 
network in the world by length (4.5 million kilometers), including 110,000 kilometers of 
expressways, according to the Chinese Ministry of Transportation.
In addition, the investment of this infrastructure made great contributions to the fast growth of 
Chinese economy, which was well known throughout the world as China's growth miracle. “Where 
there is a road, there will be prosperity and wealth” has become the rule of thumb for public officials 
to stimulate their local economy. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the 
average GDP growth for the past thirty years after China’s economic reforms (from 1979 to 2012) is 
9.8 percentage points in real terms and about 4 percentage points come from investment.
However, behind this success is the Chinese government’s nascent exploration into 
infrastructure financing. Nowadays, the central government is actively promoting public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) as a “panacea” or “silver bullet” to solve the current infrastructure financing 
challenges faced by many local governments. In this report, we would argue that these problems are 
not unique to China, and PPP is not the only solution, we would introduce some innovative financing 
methods used by some of the more developed countries in addressing this issue as well as some 
innovative managing methods that have been developed and applied across the world.
The rest of the report is organized as follows:
Section 1 states the background of the report, providing a historical review of the methods that 
the Chinese government has used for infrastructure construction and maintenance in the last three 
decades.
Section 2 presents the current situation, analyzing the financing woes faced by the Chinese 
government nowadays: constrained budgets on the one hand and the high demand for infrastructure 
construction and maintenance on the other.
Section 3 discusses innovative financing methods for infrastructure construction, introducing 
innovative methods used by some of the more developed countries in addressing this issue.
Section 4 talks about innovative managing methods for infrastructure maintenance, introducing 
innovative methods and best practices that have been developed and applied across the world for 
infrastructure maintenance.
Section 5 identifies the most urgent problems existing in current infrastructure management 
system and gives recommendations for future reforms based on internationally best practices. Taking 
into consideration the realities of China, we propose setting up a two-tier institutional framework 
(national and regional level) and implementing a three-step reform strategy (short-term, 
medium-term and long-term) to solve the problem.
Section 6 presents conclusions from this review and analysis.
Section 1: Evolution of Infrastructure Financing Method in China
We can roughly divide the methods that the Chinese government has used for infrastructure 
construction and maintenance into four stages: centrally-planned financing period (1949-1978), 
market-based financing period (1978-2000), land-based financing period (2000-2010), and the 
promotion of Public-Private Partnerships (after 2010).
Centrally-Planned Financing Period
During this period, the new republic was just built and the Chinese leaders wanted to copy the 
Soviet-type economic planning, which was best known as the planned economy. Within this 
economic system, the central government was the sole planner and financier of urban infrastructure 
projects. Starting in the 1960s, the central government began to gradually modify this system, which 
aimed to delegate certain powers and to give some autonomy to local governments (De Wang and et 
al., 2011). At that time, some types of taxation (industrial and business taxes) were permitted to 
retain as the funding resource for local infrastructure construction. However, infrastructure project 
selection and construction had to be approved by the National Planning Commission, which was a 
powerful organ of the central government.
Market-Based Financing Period
Along with the implementation of reform and opening up policy in 1978, local governments gained 
greater autonomy from the central government and the centrally-planned financing period gradually 
gave way to the market-based financing period. In 1985, the city maintenance and construction tax 
was implemented to expand local infrastructure funding sources with the idea that local government
should pay for their own bill if  the infrastructure benefits their own local residents and economy (De
Wang and et al., 2011).
Subsequently, taking note of international experience, Chinese government introduced 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) which was adopted in several provinces. The Shajiao B Power 
Plant which came into operation in 1988 in Guangdong Province is generally considered to be the 
first PPP project in China (Ke et al., 2011) and later the BOT (build-operate-transfer, one of the PPPs 
methods) had been further promoted since the 1990s, mostly used in the construction of 
expressways . However, due to the limited capacity of local government in implementing PPPs, most 
contracts were signed to the advantage of the private partners (most were foreign companies at that 
time)2 3. As a result, the central government prohibited the practice of guaranteeing fixed returns for 
foreign companies in the early 2000s, and the participation of foreign companies in PPPs in China 
gradually faded away (Wang et al., 2012).
Land-Based Financing Period
Actually, land-based financing was developed by local governments in the mid-1980s, the common 
practice was to sell the use right of state-owned land (land is owned by state in China and cannot be 
traded in the market) through open auction or competitive tendering4. With the tax-sharing reform 
between central and local governments in 1994, which generally led to more revenue for the central 
government and less revenue for the local governments, land-based financing had become the major
2 Typically, the private company provides upfront investment for the road and after construction, the government will sign a 
contract and give a certain number of years of operation right to the private investor, such as 30 years, for the repayment of their 
investment through tolls collection. Then, the company will get back its investment and the operation right will be transferred to the 
government.
3 The foreign companies were more experienced at that time, they usually charged disproportionally high fees and requested fixed 
or minimum return guarantees in the contract (Hui and Isabel, 2015).
4 Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Tianjin and Shanghai were the first batch of cities permitted to use this method (De Wang and et al., 2011)
financing resource for city infrastructure construction and maintenance from the late 1990s and to the 
early 2000s. The common financing method used by local government was Local Government 
Financing Vehicle (LGFV).
LGFV is a kind of state-owned company set up by the local government to finance and 
implement infrastructure projects. After the new company is founded, local government would 
typically transfer some of its “high quality assets” to the LGFV to improve its creditworthiness, such 
as public land or shares of public utilities owned by the local government (Hui and Isabel, 2015). 
Then, these assets are used as collateral by the LGFV for loans from commercial banks or other 
financial institutions. Finally, the money will be used for infrastructure construction and maintenance. 
The whole process can be illustrated by the following Figure.
Figure 1: Local Government Financing Vehicle
Source: Author
The Promotion of Public-Private Partnerships
The land-based financing method is the most efficient way so far for local government to finance 
their infrastructure. However, with the fast increase of LGFV debts, a new concern has arisen since 
most of the debts are guaranteed by the local governments and have become contingent liabilities, 
which has posed significant fiscal risks since 2008 (Hui and Isabel, 2015). According to the National 
Audit Office report, by the end of 2012, the total LGFV debt will stand at RMB 7.0 trillion (about 1 
trillion USD), or about 13% of the total GDP of that year. Feeling the threat of LGFV debts, the 
central government has begun to stop this fast-growing trend and want to make local government 
debts more controllable (Hui and Isabel, 2015).
Given the constraints of the land-based financing method, and the huge demand for 
infrastructure, local government had strong incentives to seek alternative and innovative ways to 
finance their projects. After 2010, the central government begun to encourage relevant ministries and 
local governments learning international experiences and adopting these best practices to China, and 
PPPs, which was first introduced to China in late 1980s, became popular again and was considered to 
have great potential in easing the current situation. In 2014, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) released a list of 80 projects and encouraged private investors to participate, 
later in that year, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) established its PPP unit, called PPP Center, and
begun to officially promote Public-Private Partnerships.
Section 2: Current Infrastructure Financing Difficulty Faced by China
After more than thirty years of rapid growth, nowadays China has entered the so-called “new normal” 
stage, which means that moderately high economic growth will replace high GDP growth and will be 
so for some time into the future.
Figure 2: China’s GDP Growth from 2006-2016 (%)
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Obviously, the decrease in GDP growth as time goes by will inevitably result in the diminishing 
of government revenue from taxation, and in a lack of funding to continue providing public 
infrastructure. However, due to its huge population and vast territory, China is still experiencing 
severe demand for infrastructure. Although China has made great progress in infrastructure 
construction, the average infrastructure capacity per capita is comparatively low.
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And also, there is a big infrastructure development imbalance between different regions, the 
development level has been advanced in Shanghai, Beijing and most of the cities in eastern region, 
but for the western and central parts of China, many of these areas still have inadequate 
transportation infrastructure, as well as inadequate telecommunications, water supply, drainage, and 
electricity supply (Li and Shum, 2001).
In the meantime, China is still under the process of fast urbanization and is experiencing the 
largest resident migration every year from rural areas to big cities. According to the latest data 
released by National Bureau of Statistics of PRC, the urbanization rate of China in 2016 is 57.4%, 
and this rate has experience an average of 1.2 percentage point annual increase in the past 10 years, 
which means that more than 20 million people moved from rural areas into cities every year from 
2006 to 2016. Furthermore, the urbanization rate is expected to speed up and exceed 60% by the year
2020 .
As we know, one of the reasons why most farmers want to live in cities in China is related to the
uneven development between rural and urban regions, especially the huge infrastructure gap between 
rural and urban areas. They want to enjoy better education system, health care services and road 
networks. However, this fast rural-to-urban migration inevitably brought lots of financial pressure on 
local government. According to central government estimates, in order to keep pace with this 
transition, city governments have to increase their fiscal expenditure by RMB 140,000, or about 
$20,000 per person so that every new migrant could enjoy the same level of public service and 20 
million new migrants means that there will be a financing gap of 400 trillion dollars faced by the 
government every year.
It is obvious that infrastructure financing difficulty will persist throughout China’s development 
in the next a couple of years, and most local governments will still experience the contradiction 
between constrained budgets and the high demand for infrastructure construction and maintenance in 
the future, and consequently how to find an effective solution is of paramount importance at the
current stage.
Section 3: Innovative Financing Methods for Infrastructure Construction
If we review history, the financing gap in infrastructure construction is not unique to China, many 
developed countries like the U.K., France, and the U.S. have experienced the same situation. After 
many years of development, different countries have created lots of innovative financing methods to 
address the infrastructure financing gap.
These innovations may not be new to other sectors. However, their application to infrastructure 
is innovative. Based on the development realities in China and the latest international practice, this 
section covers the following three parts. The first two parts talk about two innovative financing 
methods -  PPP and Value Capture. The last part presents a case study of Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) of the U.S. In the case study, instead of just focusing on finding new 
financial resources, the FHWA applies several useful tools and creates greater flexibility for the use 
of existing public resources.
Public-Private Partnership
As we mentioned in Section 1, due to its specific characteristics, the investment and construction of 
infrastructure becomes an important public sector responsibility, or to be specific, the government’s 
responsibility. However, government’s responsibility does not mean that government has to 
construct the infrastructure itself, and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) has been an effective way for 
these countries to manage to solve this problem. The United Kingdom is generally considered to be 
the first one to apply this method under the term Private Finance Initiative or PFI.
According to the newly published Public-Private Partnership Reference Guide (Version 3, the
World Bank), Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a long-term contract between a private party and a
government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant
risk and management responsibility and remuneration is linked to performance. The core concept of 
PPP is to encourage the public sector to engage the private investors to participate in infrastructure 
providing process and usually the financing gap can be alleviated to some degree through two ways.
First is cost-saving. The construction and maintenance of infrastructure has many phases, such 
as designing, building or rehabilitating, financing, maintaining and operating. It is obvious that the 
government is not an expert in most of these stages and with the increasing of industry specialization, 
it is wise for the public sector to contract out one or several stages of the whole process. Through 
PPP, governments can focus on infrastructure delivery at the most cost-effective basis, rather than 
providing these public services directly. Thus, cost-saving is expected due to the greater efficiency 
brought by private company with expertise. International experience shows that the biggest part of 
cost-saving comes from better risk allocation mechanism. When designed well and implemented in a 
balanced regulatory environment, PPP allow for the better allocation of risk between public and 
private entities, taking into account their capacity to manage those risks (the World Bank).
Second is upfront investment providing. The characteristic of government expenditure is based 
on a rolling revenue basis year by year, mainly from taxes. However, the construction of 
infrastructure often requires a large amount of upfront irreversible investment, so one of the main 
reasons for infrastructure financing gap faced by many countries is the mismatch between stable 
revenue stream of government budget and the intensive capital expenditure at the construction stage 
of infrastructure. PPP can solve this problem by attracting commercial financing (including
commercial bank financing, bonds, and private equity) as a necessary complementary method at the
beginning stage and pay back these private investments through future taxes or user fees collected 
after the project is put into operation.
However, the government should be clear that private investors do not indulge in charity for the 
public sector. They expect (and can require) very generous repayment of principle with high interest 
in the contract5. And also, the government cannot expect to solve the financing problem completely 
by encouraging private investors to provide upfront construction cost, as it just shifts the burden and 
passes the cost down to successors or even future generations.
Another problem about PPP which is widely criticized by others is the high negotiation cost 
when designing and implementing the contract. Some countries have made efforts to standardize 
elements of PPP contract design to reduce considerable time and cost frequently involved in 
preparing and finalizing a given PPP contract. They have developed standardized contractual 
provisions or even complete standardized PPP contract.
Table 1: Examples of Standardized PPP Contracts and Contract Clauses
Jurisdiction Standard Links
Australia Guidelines issued by Infrastructure Infrastructure Australia’s PPP
Australia on standard commercial Guidelines (AU 2017): Volume 3 on
principles for social an economic social infrastructure and Volume 7 on
infrastructure PPPs economic infrastructure
India Descriptions of model agreements for PPP Former Planning Commission (IN
in a range of transport sectors 2014d), (IN 2009)
5 If not a higher rate than they can get from the market, they will not put up their money but will rather put it in the market.
Netherlands Standard PPP contract for DBFM in 
buildings and DBFMO in infrastructure
Ministry of Finance Publications (NL 
2013)
New Zealand Draft standard PPP contract National Infrastructure Unit (NZ 2013)
Philippines Sample contracts for PPP in bulk water 
supply, ICT, solid waste management, and 
urban mass transit. The PPP Center is 
currently developing standardized terms 
for broader application
PPP Center: PEGR Sample Contracts 
(PEGR2009)
South Africa Standardized PPP provisions published 
alongside the South Africa PPP Manual
National Treasury Standardized PPP 
Provisions (ZA 2004c)
United Kingdom Standardized contracts for PFI projects; 
includes extensive guidance on each 
element of the contract
Her Majesty’s Treasury: Standardized 
Contracts (UK 2012 c)
Source: World Bank, 2017. Public-Private Partnerships References Guide (Version 3).
However, international best practices have shown that a well-designed contract should seek 
balance between certainty and flexibility or even have to make some compromise between them.
On the one hand, the public sectors should send a clear message to the private partner through 
the contract that what their expectations are regarding to the quality and quantity of the infrastructure 
or services to be provided. According to Farquharson’s study, a successful contract should create 
clear performance targets or requirements; they should be SMART, which is Specific, Measurable,
Achievable, Realistic, and Timely (Farquharson et al, 2011).
On the other hand, due to the long term and complex of infrastructure construction, it’s hard for
the PPP contract signed by both parties to include all the risks that they may encounter in their 
following corporation. Since fully predict future is impossible, it’s necessarily for the contract to be 
incomplete, which means it’s wise to have some flexibility built in the contract such as setting up 
some general principles with respect to the unpredicted issues, so that when the circumstance 
changed or other new problems emerged, the contracting parties can dealt with them within the 
contract as far as possible rather than renegotiating the contract or even terminating it, which will 
inevitably cause huge negotiation cost for both parties.
According to the World Bank Public-Private Partnerships Reference Guide (Version 3), the aim 
of PPP contract is therefore to create certainty where possible, and bounded flexibility where 
needed-thereby retaining clarity and limiting uncertainty for both parties (World Bank,
2017).Therefore, the public sectors have to be well aware of these issues when applying PPP.
Value Capture6
Value Capture is an innovative funding method for infrastructure construction, which aims to 
“capture” or “share” some benefit or value created by the construction of infrastructure. Usually, this 
kind of benefit or value is privately enjoyed by individuals or business and making no contribution to 
the infrastructure cost. In other words, there is a mismatch between cost payers and beneficiaries. For 
example, a new train station or school will obviously increase the values of adjacent houses or land, 
and provide significant benefit to their owners. However, these benefits or values created by the new 
infrastructure are not fully captured or shared by the government or community, who ultimately 
bears the whole cost.
6 More information please refers to Value Capture - Options, Challenges and Opportunities for Victoria.
Generally speaking, most infrastructures have this kind of effect -  they are most beneficial to 
those living or working nearby7. The goal of Value Capture is to get some funding contribution from 
those who benefit privately from the infrastructure, rather than let the government or users solely 
bear all the construction cost. The common practice for value capture mechanism is beneficiary 
charges, including developer contributions, betterment levies and major beneficiary contributions, 
which can help the government alleviate part of its financial burden by aligning the cost of 
infrastructure more closely with those individuals or businesses who benefit directly or indirectly 
from this investment, whether they actually use the facility or not.
Value Capture is generally considered to have two advantages as a complementary funding 
mechanism for infrastructure. First is equity. Compared to traditional funding resources, Value 
Capture can provide a more equitable solution for infrastructure funding. Infrastructure has long been 
recognized as a “public good” that can be used by and benefit society as a whole. However, the 
alienation of infrastructure cost from not only the users but also the beneficiaries makes the funding 
burden distribution more equitable and fair. Second is efficiency. The increase of land or house value 
can be considered as “windfall gains” for their owners, and they can be taxed without distorting 
economic activities.
We have to keep in mind there are two difficulties when applying Value Capture. First, 
sometimes it is hard to quantify the benefits of infrastructure caused to a specific beneficiary (a 
resident nearby), so it is difficult to design an accurately measuring system which can fairly prove 
the relationship between additional value generation and the construction of the new infrastructure. 
The second difficulty is the applying process of the mechanism should not be too complex, which
7 In some cases, infrastructure can also create negative impacts, such as pollution and noise.
may preclude them from being used, particularly if the cost of implementing the mechanism 
outweighs the revenue potential (Infrastructure Victoria, Value Capture Policy Paper, 2016).
Federal Highway Administration
Most of the innovations are focusing on how to close the increasing gap between infrastructure 
capital needs and available resources without direct appropriation increase from the government. 
However, there are also some innovations focusing on how to create greater flexibility for the use of 
existing public resources, since most of countries have established national or federal infrastructure 
aid funds. A good example is from United States. In 2002, the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) initiated its innovative finance initiative, with the aim to accelerate project construction and 
expand infrastructure investment, which can be achieved by several innovative tools.
Table 2: Some of the Innovative Tools Created by FHWA
Advance
Construction (AC)
States or local governments independently raise up-front capital required for a 
federally approved project and preserve eligibility for future Federal-aid 
reimbursement for that project. At a later date, the state can obligate Federal-aid 
highway funds for reimbursement of the Federal share. This tool allows states to take 
advantage of access to a variety of capital sources, including its own funds, local 
funds, anticipation notes, revenue bonds, bank loans, etc., to speed project completion.
Flexible Match Any non-Federal match that is allowed under FHWA laws and regulations other than
state and local cash contributions to a project. Flexible matches permitted under new
regulations include use of private cash and in-kind contributions, publicly owned
right-of-way, and funds from other Federal agencies.
Grant Anticipation A GARVEE is any bond or other form of debt repayable, either exclusively or
Revenue Vehicle primarily, with future Federal-aid highway funds under Section 122 of Title 23 of the
(GARVEE) United States Code. Although the source of payment is Federal-aid funds, GARVEEs 
cannot be backed by a Federal guarantee, but are issued at the sole discretion of, and 
on the security of, the state issuing entity.
Partial Conversion Process allowing states to begin a project with their own source of funding, and then
of Advance incrementally obligate Federal funds.
Construction
Right-of-Way Federal authorization is required prior to contacting property owners in the
Acquisition right-of-way acquisition process and, under traditional funding; Federal funds are 
obligated with authorization. Using partial conversion of advance construction, State 
is able to contact property owners early on in the project while preventing authorized 
funds from being tied up while in negotiation with property owners. As some 
complicated right-of-way acquisitions can take two to three years, without this 
technique, authorized funds could be tied up for long periods of time.
TE-045 Innovative A research program begun by FHWA in 1994 in response to Executive Order 12893.
Finance Initiative This finance initiative is designed to increase investment, to accelerate projects, to 
promote the use of existing innovative finance provisions, and to establish the basis 
for future initiatives by waiving selected Federal policies and procedures, thus 
allowing specific transportation projects to be advanced through the use of 
non-traditional finance mechanisms.
Source: Sihombing L, 2009. Financial Innovation for Infrastructure Financing
Section 4: Innovative Managing Methods for Infrastructure Maintenance
Compared to infrastructure construction, infrastructure maintenance is a relative new theory in China. 
Today, most Chinese cities focus too much on planning, designing and construction stages of their 
transportation infrastructure, but little attention is paid to maintenance. In fact, what troubles many 
developed countries the most is the huge cost of infrastructure maintenance. But due to difference in 
the stage of development, the problem is not quite prominent in China. Nonetheless, the problem 
starts to appear in well-developed cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. China needs to plan ahead. 
This section introduces two innovative managing methods applied in infrastructure maintenance -  
Capacity Map and Performance-Based Management. We will also introduce an innovative method 
for road maintenance financing adopted by Oregon, United States.
Capacity Map
Road maintenance has been a complex challenge for many countries, especially in undeveloped areas. 
To ameliorate the situation, Capacity Map (CM) has been widely applied as a new solution for public 
sector, which focuses on the flow of public funds from the point of “extraction” into their 
“disbursement”, with special attention paid to ‘leakage’ in the overall system (Kaiser P, 2016). As an 
effective tool, CM assists development partners and government to place emphasis on political root 
reasons, besides the importance of insufficient budget. CM provides with identification and 
measurement of the leakage during the process, in which there are administrative flaws from official 
command. It acquiesces that a high efficient bureaucracy is the one that “extracts” or collects tax, but
also spends it on providing sufficient public goods (Peters, 2002).
CM bonds the relationship between bureaucrats and other political agents who offer good public 
service. In order to detect the main reason and related leakages, CM acts as a balance between 
solving problems and providing entire advantage which ties in well with stakeholders and problems 
analysis.
An example is given to demonstrate the typical road maintenance system in developing countries. 
And the effect of CM is meant to show the flow of funds from “extraction” to “disbursement” in the 
process (Figure below). We assume that the cost of road maintaining is $100 for every year, which 
consists of 80% fuel levies, 10% vehicle registration fees and 10% toll booth payments. The figure 
shows that $70 of the total is sent to the road fund and $30 goes for other non-maintenance purposes. 
From road fund, $20 is applied to routine maintenance. However, $5 of it is lost because of deficient 
management. Besides, $45 of the total contributes to periodic management, but $15 is missing 
because of fraud by contractors or corruption by related government agencies. As a matter of fact, 
only $45 of the tax is used for maintenance in the end.
Figure 4: The Flow of Public Funds in Developing Country 
(Revenue from the beginning to the end)
$45
Source: Kaiser P J. Following the Dollar in Reforming Road Maintenance.
Apart from that, as the government continues to build new roads, more budgets are needed from
road fund as new projects need routine and periodic maintenance as well. So by unpacking the 
process, the CM highlights the possibilities of leakages on the implementation and road construction, 
which assists policy-maker to manage the process.
Performance-Based Management8
Performance based management is a kind of concept that helps government agencies to develop an 
effective measuring system for its projects. This measuring system will translate government 
intentions and societal goals into Key Performance Indicators, which is designed by the government 
and will be included in project documents for operating and maintaining transportation facilities. 
Typically, these KPIs are different numbers which include percentage, time, cost, ratios, indexes, 
dates, along with whatever can reflect project targets and government intentions and goals such as 
congestion management. Environmental protection can be achieved by conducting periodic review 
and indicator check, through which the government can guarantee that the operation of infrastructure 
projects comply with relevant regulations.
This methodology was not invented exclusively for infrastructure sector, but was applied to 
transportation area about two decades ago by the U.K., Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand, 
which are now recognized as leaders in performance based management. Application of this 
management systems has increased rapidly in transportation sector over the last decade and this 
management was initially referred to as a “transportation assent management system”, which was 
famous for its effectiveness and potential for inducing success and some practitioners have built their 
infrastructure agencies on the general principles of performance based management, such as Japan’s
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation (MLIT) and Queensland (Australia) Department
of Transport and Main Roads.
Table 3: The Application of Performance-Based Management in United States
Built on the notion of better understanding and controlling outcomes, the concept of using performance 
measurement to manage the efficiency of services and programs has been in the United States for over half a 
century. It was introduced under titles such as “RAND Corporation’s system analysis” in the 1950s and 
“planning-programming-budgeting systems” in the 1960s. However, the approach of using performance 
measurement to manage highway systems is a more recent phenomenon’ for a number of U.S. highway 
agencies.
The process has been in development for about 40 years, but has made only incremental advancements each 
decade in the transportation sector. The 1970s and 1980s found Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and 
Wisconsin creating maintenance management systems using performance indicators to reflect the scope and 
scale of the programs being performed at that time. In the early 1990s, Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, and Utah 
defined an early set of performance benchmarks for transportation after realizing that broader performance 
measurement focusing more on the outcomes of government programs was needed.” In the mid-1990s, more 
State departments of transportation (DOTs) and metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) began to 
establish and apply more comprehensive approaches to performance measurement in transportation systems. 
Over the past 10 years, more State DOTs and MPOs have turned to performance-based management in 
response to the limited resources for transportation systems and the resounding plea from the public for 
increased accountability in government programs before more tax dollars are spent on highway projects. All 
State DOTs now track asset condition and safety data, vital elements of a comprehensive performance 
management system, and are progressing toward a full and successful application of this system.
Source: Excerpt from the Key Performance Indicators in Public-Private Partnerships, A State-of-the-Practice Report 
Recently, some researches give explanations to this method. They found that it is better to
specify the private sector’s performance in terms of required outputs (such as road surface quality),
rather than inputs (such as road surfacing materials and design) wherever possible (the World Bank,
2017), since required inputs may limit private sector’s creativity and innovation in responding to the
contract requirements and also specifying inputs instead of outputs may result in less competition 
and more opportunity for corruption (Farquharson et al, 2011) For example, a World Bank study 
shows that for the power sector procurement in some countries, the contract will specify a particular 
technology in the RFP (Request for Proposal), with the intent of limiting competition and facilitating 
corruption. (World Bank Sourcebook on Government in the Electricity Sector)
However, the monitor and enforcement is another key consideration for performance 
requirement, how to gather useful information and how frequently the information is collected is 
critical for the public sector to evaluate the performance. And also, we have to notice that 
information is only part of the solution, public sectors (managers and elected officials) need to make 
good decisions based on this information for the process to be a success (Michael G, 2011). 
Innovative Method for Road Maintenance Financing in Oregon
Nowadays, most countries finance their road maintenance fund from fuel tax. China initiated a 
modest reform of its fuel tax (excise tax imposed on the sales of fuel) in 2009, which led to an 
increase in the gasoline consumption tax. The original intent of this reform is good with the idea that 
whoever benefits more from using the road should contribute more to the road maintenance. 
However, due to the defects of the tax, the revenue is unstable and inadequate.
First, the fuel tax is levied on liter basis, it will not change with oil price and inflation. When the 
cost of road maintenance increases with the increase of labor and material cost, the revenue from fuel 
tax remains the same. Second, cars are becoming more fuel efficient due to technological progress 
and stricter environmental policy. According to a new survey conducted by the U.S. Department of
Transportation, the average mileage per gallon of new cars increased from 20 in 2007 to 25 in 2015
and such efficiency improvements will definitely continue. Third, with the development of 
technology, electric vehicle becomes more and more popular in China. As a matter of fact, according 
to the International Energy Agency, China registered as many as 352,000 new electric vehicles (EV) 
in 2016. So relying on fossil fuel taxes “is a policy at war with itself’.
One of the best international practices is the Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF) implemented 
in Oregon, United States. The Oregon Legislature created the Road User Fee Task Force, an 
independent body in 2001 to investigate options for generating sustainable funding for Oregon's 
transportation system. This Task Force examined the challenges and benefits of a mileage-based road 
user charge system and the resulting program is OReGO, the nation's first fully-operational road 
usage charge program that was launched on July 1, 2015, which shows a new way to fund road 
maintenance, preservation and improvements.
Table 4: OREGON, Mileage-Based Road User Fee Evaluation
The Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF) has examined various revenue raising alternatives for replacing the 
fuels tax as the primary source of revenues for Oregon's roads. The Oregon Department of Transportation 
(ODOT) is administering the task force. The driving motivation behind this effort is concern over the steadily 
eroding purchasing power of the fuels tax, a phenomenon resulting from: a) the fact that the fuels tax is not 
indexed for inflation; b) a general reluctance on the part of voters to approve periodic increases in the tax rate; 
and c) continued increases in the fuel efficiency of new vehicles, especially hybrids and alternative-fuel vehicles. 
ODOT conducted a test designed to demonstrate the feasibility of area-wide, mileage-based road user fees. The 
purpose of the pilot test was to demonstrate the technical and administrative feasibility of implementing an 
electronic collection system for mileage-based user fees and congestion tolls. The on-board technology was 
demonstrated in May of 2004. Twenty trial vehicles were equipped with the on-board devices in the fall of 2005. 
In the spring 2006, after verifying successful functionality, 260 trial participants in Portland, Oregon, had the 
on-board equipment added to their vehicles. For a period of one year, participants paid distance charges rather 
than the fuels tax (when they filled up at the station, the fuels tax was deducted from the bill and the mileage 
charge was added). At the conclusion of the study, ODOT successfully demonstrated the feasibility of 
mileage-based user fees.
Source: excerpt from the Final Report of Oregon’s Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program
Section 5: Suggestions and Recommendations for Future Reform
The aforementioned methods and cases give great lessons to China in terms of infrastructure 
financing. However, mechanical copying of these methods will not root out the financing problems 
once for all. To make tangible progress in infrastructure financing innovation, the corresponding 
administrative management of infrastructure is required to be restructured. There are two prominent 
problems in the current management system.
The first one is that there are too many governing bodies which result in the fragmented 
supervision of infrastructure projects. There are almost ten different ministry-level agencies at the 
central government supervising different stages of the lifecycle of a infrastructure project, which 
includes the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), responsible for approving the 
general construction plan and determining the scope and scale of the project, the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), responsible for project assessment and project financial ability analysis, the Ministry of 
Transportation and Ministry o f Water Resources, responsible for issuing relevant licenses related to 
transport and water infrastructure, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, responsible for 
evaluating the environmental impact caused by the project, the Banking Regulatory Commission, 
responsible for the financing process of infrastructure, and also other Ministries if  part of the 
infrastructure is related to their responsibilities. In addition, some of the procedures have to go 
through the local level system, since almost every ministry has their provincial agencies.
As we can image, this kind of multi-ministry supervision system has resulted in huge 
efficiency loss. A famous example was the Chengdu No.6 Water Plant. Chengdu is the capital city of 
Sichuan Province, located in the southwestern part of China, due to the fast growth of local economy
and population, the city authority wanted to expand its water supply system. The project had 
received strong support from the local government from the very beginning. The Chengdu Municipal 
Government took on the responsibility for the coordination with the central government for obtaining 
required approvals, and it took about one year to get very thing done before construction, even a 
special committee was set up to assist with the acquisition of different approvals. However, this was 
still considered to be very fast compared to other similar projects in China (Chen, 2009).
Table 5: The approval processes for the Chengdu No.6 Water Plant Project
No. Approval Approval Authority
1 Approvals for establishment and operation of the project company
1.1 Approval for project company 
establishment
Chengdu Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
1.2 Pre-registration of project 
company
State Administration of Industries and Commerce
1.3 Business-opening registration 
and operating license
State Administration of Industries and Commerce
1.4 Foreign exchange registration Chengdu Branch of State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE)
1.5 Taxation registration Local Taxation Administration
1.6 Fiscal registration Local Fiscal Administration
1.7 Customs registration Customs
1.8 Approvals on labor 
administration
Labor Administration of Chengdu
2 Approvals for project financing
2.1 Approvals of financial State Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of
agreements Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
2.2 Foreign debt registration Chengdu Branch of SAFE
2.3 Registration for foreign Chengdu Branch of SAFE
security
2.4 Registration of mortgage Chengdu Administration of Property, Chengdu Land Use
raised on water plant facilities Authority, and Chengdu Administration of Industries and
Commerce
2.5 Audition and approval of loan Chengdu Branch of SAFE
repayment
Source: Chen 2009
The second problem is the lack of communication between governing agencies, and the 
disharmony between their regulations. The regulatory documents issued by different ministries often 
conflict with each other. Taking the PPP development for example, after Prime Minister Li 
Keqiang’s famous speech on actively promoting PPP for project financing in 2014, several ministries 
issued a series of policies aimed to provide basic regulatory framework for PPP. However, there 
were notably differences in the three important documents issued by the State Council, the NDRC, 
and the MOF respectively. Meanwhile, the exact roles of the NDRC and the MOF, two powerful 
ministries for the overall approval and assessment of PPP projects, are still unclear. In practice, the 
NDRC requires all the local governments’ development and reform commissions (local DRCs) to
follow its documents, while the MOF instructs local governments’ bureaus of finance (local BOFs)
to abide by its regulation (Hui, 2016), which caused lots of confusion and uncertainty to the society, 
especially private investors.
Table 6: Comparison of Regulatory Documents Issued by Different Ministries
Issuance Authorities MOF NDRC et al. State Council General 
Office
Issuance Date November 29, 2014 April 25, 2015 May 19, 2015
Document Title Operational guidelines 
for public-private 
partnerships, (pilot)
Administration method 
for concession in 
infrastructure and public 
works
Notice of instruction on 
promoting 
public-private 
partnerships in public 
service
Key Legal Term Public-private
partnerships
Concession Public-private
partnerships
Whether VfM and fiscal Both VfM and fiscally If the government needs Fiscal affordability
affordability should be affordablity should be to provide availability should be checked. No
checked before the PPP 
project is awarded
checked before 
government approval; 
otherwise the project is 
not suitable for PPP
subsidy or evaluate 
VfM, follow the 
instruction of MOF.
mentioning of VfM.
Whether VfM and fiscal Government approval is The signatories of the The public and the
affordability should be needed for contract contract should reach an private partners should
checked after the PPP revision, and the agreement if the negotiate of disputes,
project is awarded government should 
evaluate the project
every 3-5 years. 
However, it is unclear if 
VfM and fiscal 
affordability should be 
checked
contract needs revision, 
but it is unclear if VfM 
and fiscal affordability 
should be checked
but it is unclear VfM 
and fiscal affordability 
should be checked.
Legal instruments to The private partner can The concessioner and Unclear.
resolve disputes resort to arbitration or the government can
file civil lawsuits invite expert or
against the public third-party mediation.
partner. The private The concessioner can
partner can file file administrative
administrative lawsuits lawsuits against specific
against government administrative
regulator decisions decisions.
Source: Hui Jin and Isabel Rial, 2016 
A Two-tier Institutional Framework
Given the problems mentioned above, we propose restructuring and reforming the administrative 
management system with the application of various innovative approaches. Successful practices from 
other countries suggest that a strong management institution with experienced experts is important
for the implementation of innovation.
After the overall introduction and analysis, we believe that a two-tier institutional framework is
critical for the promotion of innovative financing methods in China. Creating a two-tier institutional 
structure, which includes both the national level and regional level can improve the coordination 
between the agencies affiliated with the central government and thus efficiency. The two-tier 
framework also gives sufficient autonomy to the local government in infrastructure management and 
in their innovation based on their individual socio-economic development.
For the national level, a central government agency is necessary to ensure closely coordination 
among different national authorities. Taking PPP for example, although the central government are 
actively promoting PPP currently, there is no organization at the national level in China exclusively 
responsible for PPP projects, such as Partnerships UK or the National Council for Public-Private 
Partnerships in the U.S., which is nonetheless an international common practice (According to an 
OECD report, all the 17 member countries have set up a dedicated unit.). In 2014, the MOF 
established its PPP unit, called PPP Center, with the purpose of becoming the central coordinator and 
playing a leading role in infrastructure financial innovation. However, due to the lack of 
representatives from other relevant ministries, especially from the NDRC, the center still cannot 
make itself a “one-stop shop” for any PPP regulatory issues (Hui, 2016). So we recommend that the 
proposed national-level framework should include representatives from all the relevant ministries9.
Apart from the national level, we believe a regional-level institutional framework is necessary 
for China. As we all know, there are noticeable development differences among Chinese provinces, 
if  we compare the Qinghai Province which is located in the western part of China with the Shanghai 
City which is the biggest city in the east coast, we can find that there is a huge gap from nearly all
9 Coordination could not happen unless we bring all the stakeholders on board given the specific economic and political context of 
China.
available economic indicators you can find in the Year Book and infrastructure gap is the No. 1 
cause for this uneven development. Taking advantage of its location and natural resources, eastern 
provinces became more industrialized and developed from the early 1990s, and entered an advanced 
stage of economic development compared to western and central parts of China (Yan Song, 2016). 
And, there are also big differences between western part and central parts of China.
Due to this discrepancy, the infrastructure demand, financing method, fiscal ability, users’ 
number and the affordable level of user-fee differ substantially across the three regions. With the 
intention to reflect the difference and to give certain flexibility according to the specific economic 
development context of each region, the proposed framework will divide all the provinces into three 
regions, western region, central region and eastern region, mainly based on the economic 
development level.
Figure 5: Proposed Regions of China
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We believe that a regional-level rather than province-level institution structure is an appealing 
system for today’s China. First, we all know that infrastructure projects, especially big projects, such 
as highways and railways often transcend provincial borders, regional infrastructure center will bring 
greater coordination across provinces and also will facilitate greater multi-province cooperation in 
the region, which will result in a more efficient construction and maintenance system.
Second, the infrastructure development does not have to be constrained by provincial 
boundaries, since provinces in the same region are grouped by similar demographics and economic 
level, the center can make infrastmcture development plan based on broader economic activities in 
the whole region, which will overcome geographic barriers and eliminate infrastructure development 
imbalance across the region.
Last, such an arrangement will facilitate effectively the use of limited financial resources and 
avoid wasteful investment by transforming provincial infrastmcture development competition into 
regional infrastmcture partnerships, which benefits not only the region but also the whole country 
overall.
Figure 6: Proposed S tructure of the Two-tier Institutional Fram ew ork
Source: Author
Table 7: Proposed Regions of China
Region Provinces
Eastern Beijing, Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan,
Hebei, Tianjin
Central Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi
Western Nei Mongol, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Guangxi,
Yunnan, Xinjiang, Xizang(Tibet),Qinghai
Source: China Regional Map 
A three-step implementation strategy
Although the two-tier system aforementioned will enormously improve the effects of the various 
innovative methods discussed in Section 3 and Section 4, it is advised to adopt these methods step by 
step, as these methods are experimented and applied by different countries throughout different 
stages of economic development and based on their own development status. In China’s case, we 
propose a three-step strategy.
In the short term (within 2 years), the promotion of PPP should be the major goal, and the national 
center should take on the following responsibilities:
■ Coordinating among different relevant ministries regarding infrastructure construction 
and maintenance issues, and making final decisions for any contradictions10;
■ Reviewing and checking relevant documents issued by different ministries to reduce 
confusion and uncertainties11;
10 Improving the coordination among all relevant ministries, especially the MOF and NDRC, is very important at the current stage.
11 The national center should focus on consolidating all contradiction documents into a single, clear-cut and high-level regulatory 
document in order to reduce confusion and uncertainties for the society, especially for private investors.
For the three regional centers, they should take on different responsibilities:
■ The western region should focus on making its own regional infrastructure development 
plan based on its comparatively lower development realities;
■ The central region should focus on promoting regional infrastructure projects and 
attracting private investors;
■ The eastern region should focus on providing technical assistant and professional 
advisory for the provinces within this region;
In the medium term (2-5 years), the national centers should take on the following responsibilities:
■ Clearly assigning roles and responsibilities to different ministries, reducing their 
overlapping jurisdictions of infrastructure projects supervising;
■ Removing the barriers that still constrain private investors’ entrance, broadening the 
areas and industries where private capital is encouraged to enter.
For the three regional centers, the major goal should be exploring and developing innovative 
financing methods for construction and maintenance of infrastructure based on their differences, and
■ The western region should focus more on adopting the Value Capture method taking 
advantage of its vast undeveloped land resources;
■ The central region should focus more on studying the FHWA’s case, and trying to create 
several tools with the emphasis of improving the using efficiency of the existing capital
instead of just focusing on seeking new funding resource;
■ The eastern region, which has a more advanced and mature infrastructure system, should
begin to think about infrastructure maintenance issue, which troubles many developed 
countries nowadays12.
In the long term (5-10 years), the national center should focus on:
■ Conducting periodic review of infrastructure projects to guarantee the projects 
compliance with relevant regulatory documents;
■ Disclosing projects information to the public and relevant investors.
■ Issuing explicit guidelines for accounting, reporting and auditing procedures;
The regional centers should begin to consider two things:
■ How to apply Perform-based management in order to improve the administrative 
capacity for their provinces and develop an effective measuring system for the projects in 
their region;
■ How to change the fuel tax funding system based on the practice in Oregon 
(Mileage-Based Road User Fee), which has been proved to be a more sustainable 
funding method for infrastructure maintenance.
The problem starts to appear in well-developed cities such as Beijing and Shanghai and we needs to plan ahead.
Section 6: Conclusions
We want to stress that infrastructure financing innovation is a complex issue, and there are no perfect 
methods. In order to make full use of these methods, we must familiarize ourselves with the scope of 
application and the equipping environment of various financing methods and draw upon the lessons 
from other countries’ application of these methods.
Different countries have their own headaches in this area. This also true for a specific country in 
its different development stages. Even today, many developed countries are still suffering a lot from 
infrastructure financing difficulties and are actively working on exploring methods for tackling 
infrastructure financing. We cannot expect to eradicate this challenge once-and-for-all in the near 
term, and infrastructure financing difficulties will probably persist throughout China’s economic 
development in the next a couple of years. China needs to draw lessons from successful experiences 
of other countries, but it should always base its practice on its own development realities.
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